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"LIONS AND TIGERS AND BEARS, OH MY" OR "REDSKINS
AND BRAVES AND INDIANS, OH WHY": RUMINATIONS ON
MCBRIDE V. UTAH STATE TAX COMMIssIoN, POLITICAL
CORRECTNESS, AND THE REASONABLE PERSON
andr6 douglas pond cummings
1. INTRODUCTION
It is to be hoped that one day all offensive and derogatory language,
speech, and symbols predicated on race will be completely eradicated
from our culture. In the meantime, public officials have the obligation to
ensure that they are not used with the imprimatur of the State"
On January 29, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court handed down an impor-
tant and historic opinion wherein it held that the term "Redskin" may be too
* J.D., 1997 Howard University School of Law; B.S., 1994, Brigham Young University; Mr.
cummings is currently working as an Associate at the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis in the Chi-
cago, IL Office. Previously he served as a Law Clerk to Chief Judge Joseph W. Hatchett of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and before that as a Law Clerk to
Justice Christine M. Durham of The Utah Supreme Court. The author wishes to acknowledge
the following: Professor Reginald Leamon Robinson, Professor of Law, Howard University
School of Law, for relentless mentoring, thoughtful guidance, and continual invitations to
write, present and excel; Professor Alice Thomas, Professor of Law, University of the District
of Columbia School of Law, for early guidance, patience, and lessons appropriately learned;
Amy Thomas, Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City for crucial suggestions, critical viewpoints,
and loyal friendship; the First Annual Meeting of the Regional Scholars of Color, Chicago, IL,
1999, where an initial draft of this article was presented; Professor Jonathon Stubbs, Professor
of Law, University of Richmond School of Law, for feedback, suggestions, and careful analy-
sis; Jo Davies, for excellent editing and pure friendship; Susan Maga, Lead Articles Editor,
and the California Western Law Review for insight, editing, and patience; Raquel Orton for
editing assistance and for believing; Carol Johnson, Kirkland & Ellis, for excellent technical
support; Robert and Lynne Cummings for love, support and for always teaching compassion;
Susan Cummings Grover, Kristin Cummings Albrechtsen, and Cameron Cummings, for sup-
port and never failing loyalty; Scott Schultz and Clarence Manumaleuna for vision and dili-
gence. E.D.A. is in the house. Of course, as usual, the politics and errata of this article belong
exclusively to me.
1. McBride v. Motor Vehicle Division of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 977 P.2d 467, 473
(Utah) (1999) (Durham, A.C.J., dissenting).
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
offensive a word to appear on vanity license plates in its state.2 In a bold, un-
precedented move, the five Justices of the Utah Supreme Court reversed a
previous administrative decision which had found that the term was "not of-
fensive" and was simply a mascot used for a professional sports franchise?
This despite widespread national use of the term "Redskins," due in large
part to the Washington D.C. National Football League ("NFL") team.'
This article provides an in-depth analysis of McBride v. Motor Vehicle
Division of the Utah State Tax Comm'n and particularly examines the Utah
Supreme Court's use or misuse of the objective, reasonable person standard
in the context of race, ethnicity and racial hatred. Part II of this article sets
forth the facts of and reactions to McBride. Part Im then analyzes and cri-
tiques the McBride decision. Part IV reviews and rejects the logic of the ma-
jority opinion's use of the reasonable person standard in determining the of-
fensiveness of the term "Redskin." Part V concludes by examining national
trends and the implications of McBride for this continuing debate and strug-
gle.
II. MCBRIDE GENERALLY
A. McBride v. Motor Vehicle Division of the Utah State Tax Comm'n
In McBride v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, three Utah resident Washington
Redskins fans ordered and displayed personalized license plates that read re-
spectively, "REDSKIN," "REDSKNS," and "RDSKIN."5 Two Native
American petitioners challenged these license plates before the Motor Vehi-
cle Division of the Utah State Tax Commission.6 The petitioners claimed
that these plates were a violation of a state statute and an administrative rule
forbidding vanity license plates that were "offensive to good taste and de-
cency" and bearing terms that were "vulgar, derogatory, profane, or ob-
scene."
7
2. See id. at 467; Judy Fahys & Ray Rivera, Supreme Court Rejects 'Redskin' License
Plates, S.L. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1999, at B1.
3. McBride, 977 P.2d at 467.
4. The Detroit Lions, Chicago Bears, and Detroit Tigers (Lions, and Tigers and Bears) all
prominent professional sports franchises, took their names and mascots from fierce animals
representing strength, power and determination. Unfortunately, many years ago, teams in
Washington, D.C., Atlanta, and Cleveland (Redskins and Braves and Indians) also sought to
associate their sports franchises with mascots and names befitting strength, power and feroc-
ity. Today, these teams have all come under fire for their lack of vision. See generally infra
notes 91-95.
5. McBride, 977 P.2d at 468.
6. See id.
7. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-la-411(2) (1993); UTAH ADMiN. CODE R873-22M-34 (1995).
Section 41-la-411(2) provides that the Motor Vehicle Division "may refuse to issue any com-
bination of letters, numbers, or both that may carry connotations offensive to good taste and
decency or that would be misleading." Id. Rule 873-22M-34 of the Utah Administrative Code
provides in pertinent part:
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The vigorous debate before the Supreme Court at oral argument focused
on whether the term "Redskin" was a derogatory, vulgar and obscene racial
epithet, or whether it had become a benign nickname of a professional sports
franchise, and therefore was not offensive.' The Native American petitioners
claimed that the term "Redskin" was descriptive of an early practice in the
colonial United States whereby the British Crown offered a "bounty for the
scalps of Native American men, women, and children." In order to collect
the bounty, the colonials were required to "skin the body of the Native
American and bring in the 'red skin"' as proof of the kill.9
The vanity plate owners countered that "they harbored no ill-will" to-
ward their Native American neighbors. Rather they wanted to express their
unabashed joy in, and support for, their favorite NFL football team."
Siding with the Native American petitioners, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed the Tax Commission's holding that the term "Redskin" was not of-
fensive and ordered it to apply a "reasonable person" standard in determin-
ing whether "any connotation" of that term could be considered offensive."
On March 4, 1999, the Tax Commission returned a unanimous decision that
found the name "Redskin" did indeed contain at least one connotation that
was offensive, and was therefore in violation of the commission's own ad-
ministrative rule. 2 The personalized vanity plates at issue were revoked.
B. Reactions
Utah reactions to the Supreme Court decision and the Tax Commission
ruling were surprising in their intensity. 3 One of the vanity plate owners
B. Pursuant to Section 41-la-41 1, the division may not issue personalized license
plates in the following formats:
1. Combination of letters, words, or numbers with any connotation that is vulgar,
derogatory, profane or obscene....
4. Combinations of letters, words, or numbers that express contempt, ridicule, or
superiority of a race, religion, deity, ethnic heritage, gender, or political affiliation.
Id.
8. See McBride, 977 P.2d at 468 (reviewing the arguments and exhibits presented at the
formal hearing before the Tax Commission, which arguments were primarily the same as
those argued before the Supreme Court).
9. Id. at 473 (Durham, A.C.J., dissenting).
10. Id.at468.
11. See id. at 470.
12. See Ray Rivera, Panel Revokes 'Redskins' Plates Deemed as Slur, S.L. TRm., Mar. 4,
1999, at Al ("The four-person commission, which included three new panel members, voted
unanimously to reverse its 1996 decision allowing the personalized plates, which said
'REDSKIN,' 'REDSKNS,' and 'RDSKIN.' The change of heart came a month after the Utah
Supreme Court ruled the Commission should have considered what an 'objective, reasonable'
person would find offensive.").
13. Upon hearing the Supreme Court ruling, Kathy Jackson, one of the vanity plate own-
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
claimed that the Native American plaintiffs likely never "saw her plates,"
and that the lawsuit was less about doing the right thing and more about a
"trumped-up effort" to gain publicity. 4 Michael McBride, one of the Native
American petitioners, speaking in his native Lakota language, praised his at-
torney, Brian Barnard, and reiterated that this lawsuit would benefit Native
American children everywhere.'5 "I'm not doing this just for myself,"
McBride declared.'6 McBride recalled being referred to as "redskin" in his
childhood and remembered that "[tihe way it's used, it ridicules a race of
people. It hurts.... My skin is not red; no other Indian's skin is red .... It is
a derogatory and denigrating term.' 7 "The feeling I get from it... is an-
ger. ,,'
8
The Assistant Attorney General who had argued the case before the Su-
preme Court for the Tax Commission, tried to downplay the Supreme Court
ruling by calling it a "split decision without finality."'9 This hollow assertion
is belied by a cursory reading of McBride in which all five Justices of the
Supreme Court agreed that the term "Redskin" could have obscene and de-
rogatory connotations and remanded the case to the Tax Commission to so
find.2" Meanwhile, attorney Barnard lamented the length of the invalidation
process by declaring "[t]hey should have revoked the plates a long time
ago."2' Barnard continued "[i]t's an appropriate decision and a decision that
ers declared "It's a sports team-that's all it is.... If I felt those two Native Americans were
offended, I could take a little heart in this .... But this is a trumped-up thing to get [attorney]
Brian Barnard's name in the paper." Fahys & Rivera, supra note 2, at B1. Michael McBride,
one of the Native American petitioners, claimed that Jackson was "hurting a whole race of
people" with her "REDSKIN" vanity plate. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id.
17. Joe Costanzo, End of the Road for Utah Plate? Justices Send the Issue Back to Tax
Commission, DESERET NEWS, Jan. 30, 1999. McBride further stated that it does not matter if
the term "Redskin" is being hurled at an Indian child by a white playmate, blazoned across thejerseys of a National Football League team, or stamped onto a Utah license plate, the term is
racist and debilitating nonetheless. See id.
18. Id. In a similar reaction to being referred to as a "Redskin," Keith Harper, a member
of the Native American Rights Fund stated "[i]f you dehumanize us, then you can enslave us,
then you can commit genocide against us." Daniel A. Grech, Activists Team Up Against 'Red-
skins'; Protesters At Rally Call For Name Change, WASH. PosT, June 20, 1999, at C5.
19. Fahys & Rivera, supra note 2. The intensity with which the Tax Commission and the
State Attorney General defended the "REDSKIN" license plates was startling. Particularly
startling when considering that the same tax board that validated the "REDSKIN" plate was
the same tax board that invalidated vanity plates bearing the monikers "TAX2MAX,"
'TAXLAND," and "MINWAGE" as violative of the statute and administrative rule at issue.
See Rolley & Wells, License Plates 2MAKETAX Folks See Red, S. L. TRm., June 3, 1998, at
B1; McBride, 977 P.2d at 473. The tax board's surprising actions are difficult to analyze:
amidst swirling controversy, the tax board decided that the term "Redskin" was not offensive
nor derogatory, but then quietly determined later that "TAX2MAX" and "TAXLAND" was
too offensive and derogatory to appear on Utah personalized license plates. See id.
20. See generally McBride, 977 P.2d at 467.
21. Fahys & Rivera, supra note 2.
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hopefully will educate people as to the offensive meaning and offensive his-
tory of that term.' '22
C. Nationwide Dispute
To be sure, the vanity plate dispute does not reflect merely a Utah issue;
it mirrors a nationwide controversy that has been increasing in magnitude in
the United States for many years. The use of Native American symbols and
nicknames by professional sports franchises has engendered bitter debate be-
tween Native Americans (and other opponents) and sports enthusiasts (and
other detractors).' Much has been written in legal periodicals, particularly
over the past decade, debating the appropriate place for legal action as it re-
lates to Native American images and symbols in popular culture.24
11. MCBRIDE ANALYSIS
The Utah Supreme Court split three to two in announcing its decision to
invalidate a Utah Tax Court ruling which had found that the term "Redskin"
was not offensive to good taste or decency, was not derogatory, and was not
obscene. Although the vote was split, the division of the court was actually
based on how best to react to the obviously offensive term. 6 All five Justices
agreed that the term "Redskin" could contain offensive and derogatory con-
notations that would require revocation of the vanity license plates bearing
the term.2
22. Rivera, supra note 12, at Al.
23. See generally Ethan G. Zlotchew, "Scandalous" or "Disparaging"? t Should Make a
Difference in Opposition and Cancellations Actions: Views on the Lanham Act's Section 2(A)
Prohibitions Using the Example of Native American Symbolism in Athletics, 22 COLuM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 217 (1998); Michelle B. Lee, Section 2(A) of the Lanham Act as a Restriction on
Sports Team Names: Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?, 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 65 (1997);
Jendi B. Reiter, Redskins and Scarlet Letters: Why "Immoral" and "Scandalous" Trademarks
Should be Federally Registerable, 6 FED. CIRcurr B. J. 191 (1996); George Likourezos, A
Case of First Impression: American Indians Seek Cancellation of the Trademarked Term
"Redskins," 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 275 (1996); Paul E. Loving, Native Ameri-
can Names in Athletics: It's Time to Trade These Marks, 13 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1 (1992);
Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How
Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 7 (1994).
24. See supra note 23.
25. See generally McBride, 977 P.2d at 467.
26. See id. (Zimmerman, J., concurring and Durham, A.C.J., dissenting (joined by Ster-
wart, J.)).
27. See id; Joe Costanzo, Justices Reject 'REDSKIN' Ruling: Court Assails Tax Panel for
Allowing Plate, DESER-T NEWS, Jan. 29, 1999 ("A controversial Tax Commission decision
that allowed the use of the term 'REDSKIN' on a Utah license plate was reversed and assailed
by the Utah Supreme Court justices on Friday.... In a splintered but essentially unanimous
opinion.., the Supreme Court ... ordered the Tax Commission to reconsider its earlier ruling
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
The difference in opinion between Justice Leonard Russon, the author
of the majority opinion, and Associate Chief Justice Christine Durham, the
author of the dissenting opinion, revolved around what standard of review
should have been applied and what procedural result should have ultimately
been reached.' Essentially, Justices Durham, Daniel Stewart and Michael
Zimmerman agreed that the term "Redskin" was offensive and carried at
least one connotation that would automatically disqualify the term from ap-
pearing on a state sanctioned license plate." On the other hand, Justice Rus-
son and Chief Justice Richard Howe withheld any determination on whether
the term "Redskin" was offensive, vulgar and derogatory, holding instead
that the Tax Commission had applied an inappropriate standard of review.
The matter was sent back to the Commission to apply the appropriate stan-
dard in determining whether any term appearing on vanity license plates was
offensive.30 These differences in rationale were at the root of the division in
this opinion, and globally are at the root of the nationwide dispute.
and to use as its standard of review 'that of the objective, reasonable person."').
28. See McBride, 977 P.2d at 468, 472.
29. See id at 471-73. Associate Chief Justice Durham and Justice Stewart, through joining
her dissent, plainly state:
The end of the majority opinion's extensive analysis is a refusal to invalidate the
issuance of personalized license plates containing an acknowledged racial epithet.
This Court should hold that the Tax Commission violated its own administrative
rule, and we should also invalidate the issuance of the plates outright instead of
remanding the matter to the Tax Commission.
Id. at 472. Justice Zimmerman echoes this in his special concurrence when he essentially
warns the Tax Commission to do the right thing by following its own administrative rule
through invalidating the plates:
I note that the Tax Commission's own rule requires it to deny a personalized plate
that has a term that a reasonable person would conclude has "any connotation that
is.., derogatory." Without prejudging the matter, it appears that it would be ex-
tremely difficult for a "reasonable person" to find that the term "redskin" does not
have at least one offensive connotation.
Id. at 471. With the three judge block of Justices Durham, Stewart, and Zimmerman, a major-
ity of the Utah Supreme Court agreed that the term "Redskin" was an offensive, derogatory,
and inappropriate use of a racial slur (or at least in the case of Justice Zimmerman, had at least
one connotation that could be perceived as such). Justices Durham and Stewart acknowledged
this racial slur openly and Justice Zimmerman apparently was compelled by the language of
the administrative rule to so agree. See id.
30. See id. Justice Russon writes:
The Commission in its written order determined that the term "redskin" was not
offensive either to individual commissioners or to the general public and that the
term therefore did not violate either section 41-la-411 or rule 873-22M-34. In light
of the foregoing, we hold that the Commission did not apply the correct test in de-
termining whether a license plate contains a prohibited connotation or expression.
We therefore reverse the Commission's order and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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A. McBride Majority
The statute at issue in McBride was section 41-1a-41 1 of the Utah Code.
The Utah legislature granted the Motor Vehicle Division of the Utah State
Tax Commission the discretion to determine whether or not to validate an
applicant's request for a personalized license plate, as follows: "The division
may refuse to issue any combination of letters, numbers, or both that may
carry connotations offensive to good taste and decency or that would be mis-
leading."3 Exercising its rule making authority,32 the Tax Commission en-
acted an administrative rule for self-guidance in determining whether to
deny personalized license plate requests:
B. Pursuant to Section 41-la-411(2), the division may not issue personal-
ized license plates in the following formats:
1. Combinations of letters, words or numbers with any connotation that is
vulgar, derogatory, profane, or obscene....
4. Combination of letters, words, or numbers that express contempt, ridi-
cule, or superiority of a race, religion, deity, ethnic heritage, gender, or po-
litical affiliation.3"
In December 1995, Native American petitioners Michael McBride and
Jay Brummet petitioned the Motor Vehicle Division of the Tax Commission
to revoke the three Utah vanity plates containing the term "REDSKIN" as
violative of the aforementioned state statutes.' The Motor Vehicle Division
denied the petition and the petitioners appealed to the Tax Commission?5 On
August 28, 1996, the Tax Commission held a formal hearing wherein peti-
tioners related their personal experiences with the term "Redskin," and
where dozens of affidavits and exhibits were entered denoting the historical
roots of the term.36 Also at the formal hearing, the vanity plate owners testi-
fied that they were fans of the "Washington Redskins," an NFL team in
Washington, D.C., and "that the only reason they requested the plates was to
show their support and admiration for that team."'37
31. UTAH CODEANN. § 41-la-411(2) (1993).
32. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-la-104(3) (1993) (granting the Tax Commission the au-
thority to "make and enforce rules necessary to effectuate" the Motor Vehicle Act).
33. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R873-22M-34 (1995). Interestingly, while the administrative rule
forbids ("may not") the issuance of license plates that carry "any connotation" that is "vulgar,
derogatory, profane, or obscene" and forbids the issuance of license plates that "express con-
tempt, ridicule, or superiority" based on "race, religion... ethnic heritage," the majority opin-
ion focuses on the term "Redskin" carrying a connotation that is "derogatory" and gives short
shrift to the seemingly more obvious violation of the term "Redskin" expressing contempt
based on "race" and "ethnic heritage." See McBride, 977 P.2d at 468-71.
34. See McBride, 977 P.2d at 467.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Id.
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On September 9, 1996, the Tax Commission denied McBride's and
Brummet's petition in a written order.38 The Tax Commission determined
that:
the same issues were raised by petitioner's attorney in Brian M. Barnard v.
Motor Vehicle Division... and that the final order in that appeal, dated
December 22, 1994, was fully dispositive of petitioners' appeal. The
Commission attached a copy of its 1994 order and incorporated it into the
1996 order, which is the subject of this appeal.39
In denying the request, the Tax Commission relied wholly on the fact
that, because the Washington Redskins were recognized nationwide, if not
worldwide, as a sports team, the term was "not offensive" and did not "ex-
press 'contempt, ridicule, or superiority."" Two commissioners went so far
as to write that "in their opinion, the license plates expressed positive sup-
port" and that such positive support fell well within the limits of the statute
and the administrative rule.4'
On appeal before the Supreme Court, McBride and Brummet argued
that the Tax Commission's decision should be overturned on the grounds
that (1) it violated section 41-1a-41 1 of the Utah Code, (2) it violated admin-
istrative rule 873-22M-34, and (3) its decision was not supported by substan-
tial evidence.42
The majority opinion focused its analysis on what was deemed to be the
erroneous standard of review the Tax Commission used in its disposition of
the issues.43 Because two Commissioners relied on their own personal view
38. See id at 468.
39. Id. (citations omitted). The Utah Court of Appeals reviewed Barnard's appeal, after
the Utah Supreme Court transferred the matter, and denied review essentially finding that Bar-
nard lacked standing to challenge the offensive nature of the term "Redskin" because he was
not Native American himself. See Barnard v. Motor Vehicle Div., 905 P.2d 317, 320-23 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995). Essentially Barnard himself earlier challenged the "Redskin" license plates as
violative of state statute. See id. Because he was denied review based on standing, Barnard
brought the case a second time at the behest of Native American petitioners. This second chal-
lenge was the dispute at issue before the Supreme Court. Another point of great interest can be
raised here based on the denial of the Utah Court of Appeals to review Barnard's first chal-
lenge because he himself is not recognizably Native American. The Court of Appeals appears
to be paternalistically determining that a non-Native American petitioner cannot be offended
or degraded by a racial slur directed at a race other than his own. See generally id. at 320-23.
The statute and rule at issue here merely state that terms may not appear on vanity license
plates if they are offensive, derogatory profane or if they express contempt based on race, re-
ligion or ethnicity. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. The Utah Court of Appeals
essentially held that Barnard, due to the fact that he was not Native American, could not be
offended or degraded by the term "Redskin." See generally Barnard, 905 P.2d at 320-23. This
determination is a weak and short-sighted attempt apparently meant to deflect answering a dif-
ficult question. Certainly racial epithets and slurs can deeply offend individuals who are not
the ultimate target of the intended offense.
40. McBride, 977 P.2d at 468 (quoting written order of Tax Commission).
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 469 ("As is evident from the Commission's order, the Commissioners could
[Vol. 36
1999] RUMINATIONS ON MCBRIDE V. UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 19
of the term "Redskin," an additional Commissioner analyzed the term as the
"general public" would, and because one final Commissioner determined his
analysis based on what "some people" felt, the majority believed that its
main objective and priority was to establish an appropriate standard under
which to analyze offensiveness in the future."
To begin its analysis, the McBride majority immediately repudiated the
Tax Commissioners' use of their own personal opinions in determining the
level of offensiveness of the challenged term.45 "Relying upon the opinion of
any one person or group in determining whether a term carries a prohibited
connotation is not a reasonable application of either section 41-la-411 or
rule 873-22M-34. ' 46 By determining that it was inappropriate for the Com-
missioners to use their own opinion, the majority rejected the idea that a lone
opinion can be deterninative.4
Next, the majority opinion dismissed the notion that "the general pub-
lic's perception" was an appropriate test for determining the offensiveness of
a particular term.4" Because "the general public may be wholly ignorant of a
term's connotation," the majority determined that it was unreasonable to rely
on the perceptions and feelings of the general public.49
not agree on the appropriate test to apply in determining whether the license plates should be
revoked. Commissioners Oveson and Shearer believed that their own opinions of offensive-
ness were controlling. Commissioner Tew, however, believed that the appropriate test was
whether the 'general public' would consider the plates offensive. In his dissent, Commissioner
Pacheco argued that the test should be whether only 'some people' were offended.").
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id. The majority continues by claiming that the opinion of any one person would al-
ways be unreasonable whether the opinion is that of a government official, a Native American
citizen, a non-Native American, or any individual in general. See id. The majority further
opines:
[T]he personal opinions of individual commissioners should not be relevant in ap-
plying the rule, for a term that is offensive or derogatory to one commissioner may
be innocuous to another. Permitting the Commission to base its decisions upon the
personal opinions of its commissioners would be tantamount to allowing an
agency to follow or ignore its own rules to suit its own purposes-an approach
which lies at the very heart of arbitrary and capricious action and which would
frustrate the Commission's proper role to apply its rules consistently and objec-
tively, regardless of the personal views of individual commissioners.
Id. at 470.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The majority uses an example to make its point:
[O]ffensive slang in an obscure foreign language may be meaningless to the gen-
eral English-speaking public; nevertheless, the reasonable person who speaks the
foreign language would conclude that the slang carries an offensive connotation.
Id. See, e.g., Kahn v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 16 Cal. App. 4th 159, 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d 6, 13 (Ct. App. 1993) (revoking license plate containing court reporter symbols repre-
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The majority further stated that relying "upon the opinion of any one
group, whether it be small or large" would be an unreasonable approach by
the Tax Commission in determining a term's offensiveness." The majority
firmly declared that if reliance upon "any one group" were permitted, then
the "issuance of any personalized license plate" would be precluded because
"members of any group could assert that any given term is offensive to
them."5' The majority concluded its "sky is falling" analysis as it pertains to
the perceptions or opinions of "any one group" by stating that "virtually any
term could be barred so long as 'some people' found it offensive."52
Finally, the majority declared that the only reasonable and applicable
standard when a court or agency was called upon to determine the offensive-
ness of a challenged term was the objective reasonable person standard. 3 "In
other words, under rule 873-22M-34 the Commission had to determine, in
light of all the evidence presented, whether an objective, reasonable person
would conclude that the term 'redskin' contains any vulgar, derogatory, pro-
fane, or obscene connotation, or expresses contempt, ridicule or superiority
of race or ethnic heritage."' Thus, without ruling on whether the term "Red-
skin" was offensive, derogatory, or in violation of the statute, the majority
held that if an objective, reasonable person might conclude that a term car-
ried at least one connotation that was offensive, derogatory or profane, then
the Tax Commission was prohibited, by its own rule, from issuing a license
plate carrying that term." The majority held that: "[i]n light of the foregoing,
we hold that the Commission did not apply the correct test in determining
whether a license plate contains a prohibited connotation or expression. We
therefore reverse the Commission's order and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion."56
senting "the four letter epithet often referred to as the 'F-word').
50. Id., but see infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. To buttress its statement that relying upon the opinion of any group whether it be
large or small as absolutely unreasonable, the majority used an example:
To illustrate, the Commission gave an example in its order of a complainant who
challenged the issuance of a license plate bearing the combination "023 GNG."
According to the complainant, the plate extolled the virtues of the 23rd Street
Gang in Ogden, Utah. Ironically, the plate was not a personalized plate, but a nor-
mal plate bearing the letters and numbers generated by computer.
Id. Apparently, this example was more than enough evidence to convince the majority that if
reliance upon perceptions or opinions of general groups of citizens whether large or small was
allowed, then no personalized plates would ever be approved in Utah because virtually "any
term" could be challenged as offensive. Id.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id.
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B. McBride Dissent
In a stinging rebuke to the majority, the dissenting opinion focused pri-
marily upon the extensive evidence, facts, and exhibits placed into the record
by the Native American petitioners, most of which, the majority ignored. 7
The dissent took issue with the majority's refusal to invalidate the offending
plates outright suggesting that those in the majority ducked the most impor-
tant question. 8
In coming to this conclusion, Justice Durham noted several key points
that the majority failed to address. First, the dissent criticized the majority
for "gratuitously, and with no analytical support" deciding that relying upon
the "opinion of any one person or group" could be a reasonable application
of the statutes and rules in question. 9 While agreeing that to take into ac-
count the "personal opinions" of the Tax Commission would be an unrea-
sonable application, the dissent belittles the majority for determining "that
the 'opinion' of the petitioners should not count either."' Particularly puz-
zling to Justice Durham, was the majority's refusal to recognize that the Na-
tive American petitioners expressed far more than mere "opinion" in chal-
lenging the racial epithet: "I do not understand exactly what evidence the
majority would require to demonstrate that a derogatory and obscene racial
slur is more than just the "opinion" of its targets and is in fact offensive. Cer-
tainly, in my mind, petitioners proved far more than just their personal opin-
ions."
57. See generally McBride, 977 P.2d at 470-73 (Durham, A.C.J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 470. In the dissent, Justice Durham, joined by Justice Stewart, writes:
The end of the majority opinion's extensive analysis is a refusal to invalidate the
issuance of personalized license plates containing an acknowledged racial epithet.
This court should hold that the Tax Commission violated its own administrative
rule, and we should also invalidate the issuance of the plates outright instead of
remanding the matter to the Tax Commission.
Id. at 472. The dissent seems to scold the majority for failing to make a definitive statement
and for failing to stand up in determining whether the term "Redskin" is indeed offensive and
derogatory. See generally id. at 470-73. Rather, the majority pawns this task off on the Tax
Commission, but in reality, giving that Commission little choice in the decision it must make.
See McBride, 977 P.2d at 471. (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("Without prejudging the matter,
it appears that it would be extremely difficult for a 'reasonable person' to find that the term
'redskin' does not have at least one offensive connotation.").
59. Id. at 472 (Durham, A.C.J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion).
60. Id. In "gratuitously" declaring that those parties or individuals offended or degraded
by the offensive or vulgar nature of a term are merely expressing an "opinion," and in decid-
ing that the "opinion" of that individual or those groups should never count or be considered
when determining whether a term is derogatory or expresses contempt based on race or ethnic
heritage, the majority itself degrades those in minority populations and insular groups who
often rely on government and state protection from racial animosity. See generally id.; see
also infra notes 99-101.
61. See id. at 472. (Durham, A.C.J., dissenting).
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Secondly, the dissent was critical of the majority for ignoring the testi-
mony and affidavits of educators and clinical psychiatrists when it refused to
declare the term "Redskin" offensive and derogatory.62 The dissent pointed
out that the majority ignored facts that showed conclusively that the term
"Redskin" is "the name and symbol of the genocidal practice of paying
white soldiers a bounty for the bloody skins of murdered Native Ameri-
cans."
63
[I]n 1755, the British Crown offered a bounty for the scalps of Native
American men, women, and children living in the New England colonies.
As stated plainly in the affidavit of a clinical psychologist: To demonstrate
that there had been a kill, soldiers were required to skin the body of the
Native American and bring in the "red skin." "Redskin" is in particular a
horrifying reminder of what amounted to genocide of many of the Native
American people. 4
The dissent clearly explained that the Washington N.F.L. football team
and the staunch supporters of the team and logo, either purposely or unwit-
tingly, celebrate a term representing particularized genocide and murder.65
This reality exists even though the majority ignored this historical discussion
of the term "Redskin." 6
Next, the dissent criticized the majority for failing to consider current
trends and greater public awareness when it refused to invalidate the chal-
lenged term outright.67 Justice Durham pointed out that in recent years many
colleges and professional sports teams have changed antiquated nicknames,
mascots and logos due to their offensive nature.'
Saint John's University has in recent years changed the name of its mascot
from "Redmen" to "Red Storm." Sioux City Iowa has recently ceased us-
ing the name "Soos" for its minor league baseball team. The Washington
Redskins have been under fire for years to change the name of its football
team.69
Justice Durham noted that despite inexplicable resistance from team
owners, the Washington D.C. City Council "passed a resolution asking the
62. See McBride, 977 P.2d at 472.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See McBride, 977 P.2d at 472.
69. Id. Further evidence of this trend "away from the cartoonish and derogatory use of the
image of Native Americans as mascots," include Stanford University, switching its mascot
from "Indians" to the "Cardinal" and also high profile mascot changes at Marquette and Dart-
mouth universities. Id. at 472. See Note, A Public Accommodations Challenge to the Use of
hdian Team Names and Mascots in Professional Sports, 112 HARv. L. REV. 904, 905 n.16
(1999) [hereinafter Public Accommodations]. In fact "[o]ver 100 colleges and universities
have replaced Indian team names and Indian mascots." Id. n.16.
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Washington Redskins to change its team name to 'a name that is not offen-
sive to Native Americans or any other minority group."'
70
Lastly, the dissent rejected the reasoning of the majority because the
majority ignored compelling evidence that the term "Redskin" was an offen-
sive racial epithet.71 The majority refused to acknowledge evidence presented
by petitioners showing the definition of "Redskin" in the dictionary exactly
mirrored the definition of the "n-word."'7 As Justice Durham wrote "[t]he
term 'Redskin' has been defined by Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dic-
tionary as 'American Indian-usually taken to be offensive'.... Similarly,
the term [n-word] is defined by this same dictionary as 'Negro-usually
taken to be offensive."'73 The dissent proclaimed that "no court in this coun-
try would approve legislative enactment allowing the use of such a destruc-
70. McBiide, 977 P.2d at 472. Noting that because the '"Washington Redskins" are pri-
vately owned, the dissent points out that said private owners can take any name they wish and
ignore editorials, resolutions passed by city councils, and public opinion generally. See id. In-
terestingly, the Washington N.F.L. team has recently been purchased by new ownership giving
Native Americans and other activists hope that new ownership would seriously consider
changing the team name. See Leonard Shapiro & Mark Maske, NFL Approves Snyder as Red-
skins Owner, WASH. POST, May 26, 1999, at Al; Grech, supra note 18. Unfortunately, despite
much criticism, Daniel Snyder, the new owner has indicated that he has no intention to change
the team name or mascot. See Gene Weingarten, Memo: A Home Team Name Game, WASH.
POST, Jan. 12, 1999, at Cl; see also Terrance Lynch, Don't Publish A Name Rooted In Ra-
cism, WASH. POST, June 27, 1999 at B8 ("Certainly, The Post and other publications do not
print other pejorative words used to describe ethnic or cultural groups-so why is it different
with this name? Ethnic slurs and name-calling are efforts by one culture to subjugate or have
power over another. Publishing these words helps legitimize a destructive pattern of behav-
ior."). This refusal comes on the heels of another Washington D.C. professional team owner,
Abe Pollin, actually changing the name and mascot of his team, the Washington Bullets to the
Washington Wizards, because he claimed that the original name (Bullets) connoted violence
in a violent city. See Weingarten, Memo: A Home Team Name Game, id. at Cl. The change
from Bullets to Wizards is ironic in a city that shares a team named after an acknowledged ra-
cial epithet. See Grech, supra note 18, at C5 ("'Redskin' is the single most insulting word a
Native American can be called in the English language .... 'by using the name, people don't
even know they are engaging in a tradition of racism."').
New Washington N.F.L. team owner Daniel Snyder is apparently in good company with his
racial insensitivities and cavalier attitude, as he joins thirty other N.F.L. team owners. Accord-
ing to the Reverend Jesse Jackson, the N.F.L. is a league supported by "a culture driven by
white supremacists." Peter King, Jackson: NFL coach-hiring practices 'a culture driven by
white supremacists.'<http:llcnnsi.comlfootballl nfl/2000/playoffs/super. bowllnews/2000/01/
28/Jackson_o/index.htm>, Jan. 29, 2000. "In a stinging rebuke of the National Football
League's head-coach hiring practices the Rev. Jesse Jackson said Friday night that the slow
pace of black coaching hires in the league is a result of a 'culture driven by white suprema-
cists."' Id. If a culture of white supremacy permeates the N.FL., and presumably other profes-
sional sports, as Jackson alleges, then team owner refusal to change racists mascots and their
debilitating mockery of cultures seems unquestionably discriminatory and hateful, just as their
refusal to hire minority coaches seems so frighteningly out of touch. See generally id.
71. See McBride, 977 P.2d at 472 (Durham, A.C.J., dissenting).
72. See id.
73. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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tive epithet as the 'n' word on a license plate."'74
The dissent concluded by stating that, rather than using the objective
reasonable person standard, the majority should have based its analysis on
the objections and evidence offered by the offended Native American peti-
tioners or in other words, should have applied a reasonable Native American
standard."
Petitioners introduced overwhelming evidence showing that the term "red-
skin" is derogatory and profane, that it expresses contempt and ridicule,
and that it references the historical domination of a defined class of per-
sons based on race and ethnic heritage. This evidence demonstrates con-
clusively that the Tax Commission violated its own rule. By ignoring evi-
dence and by establishing an arbitrary reasonable person standard, the
majority misses the mark imposed by rule 873-22M-34.76
C. Ruminations
Given the opportunity to make a defining statement in the nationwide
debate over the use of Native American symbols and culture as mascots, the
Utah Supreme Court majority failed. While its holding, that the challenged
term might contain offensive connotations was the first judicial ruling of its
kind and an obvious victory for Native American activists, the Supreme
Court did not go as far as it could or perhaps should have.' The Tax Com-
mission, taking its cue from the special concurrence and the dissent, invali-
dated the license plates unanimously.78
While the majority went to great lengths to discuss "judicial restraint"
and its obligation to protect "the integrity of the judicial system" in explain-
ing away its indecisive statement and voice, it completely missed the impor-
tance of the "mandate" the decision in its entirety, actually decrees 9 While
74. See id. "Notwithstanding this equivalence in the dictionary-an objective source in-
deed-the majority remands this case to the Tax Commission for further consideration. I
would reverse the Tax Commission and immediately revoke the personalized plates at issue."
Id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Justice Zimmerman's concurrence suggests that although he signed on with the ma-jority, if the Tax Commission on remand again found that the term "Redskin" was not offen-
sive, when that decision was appealed, he would find outright that the term did contain at least
one connotation that was offensive, and invalidate the license plates. See supra text
accompanying notes 29, 58.
78. See supra note 12. The Tax Commission, just over one month after McBride was re-
manded, found as follows:
We conclude that the objective, reasonable person required to determine if there is
,any connotation that' the term Redskin is 'derogatory,' or expresses contempt or
ridicule for a race or ethnic heritage, would be led to the inescapable conclusion
that the term has at least one such connotation.
Tax Panel Revokes 3 "Redskin" Plates, Dnsnar NEws, Mar. 5, 1999.
79. McBride, 977 P.2d at 470; supra notes 29, 58, 77.
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Justice Zimmerman concurred in the majority opinion, he wrote "specially"
to imply that if the Tax Commission, upon remand, came back with another
"not offensive" holding, then the likely result would be a switch of his vote
to the dissent position which position, objects more strongly to the use of the
term and calls for invalidating the plates outright, thereby finding the term
to be a racial epithet.8' While Justice Russon made much of his self-
proclaimed protector of judicial integrity status in the majority opinion,8 theimplications of Justice Zimmerman's opinion undermines the majority's po-
sition.' The Tax Commission was given a new standard by which to analyze
the dispute on remand, but the Tax Commission was also told the appropri-
ate response to bring back-through the pointed dissent and the warning of
the special concurrence.'
The majority also failed in its assessment when it casually referred to a
"survey" that apparently found that of "425 Native American tribal leaders"
surveyed, "72.24% of them did not find the term 'Washington Redskins' of-
fensive."' A cursory review of the literature simply does not bear this asser-
tion out.
Racial insults are documented to cause psychological and physical harms.
Indian team names and mascots in particular have been charged with fos-
tering "racial stereotyping," causing low self-esteem among American In-
dians, and setting up Indian children as targets for physical harassment by
their peers. The racial epithet [n-word] has been held to be so intimidating
that its use against a patron of a place of public accommodation constitutes
a denial of full and equal enjoyment; the word "redskin" is similarly in-
dicative of racial animus and comparable in vituperative force.'
Other reports indicate that the "NCAI, which represents 520 Indian Na-
tions, is 'the oldest and largest national organization representative of and
advocate for national, regional, and local tribal concerns."'86 Further, that in
80. See id. at 471 (Zimmerman, J. concurring specially).
81. See id. ("While Justice Durham would step into the role of a Utah State tax commis-
sioner in order to weigh the evidence and decide the issue in the first instance... we refuse to
do so. By exercising judicial restraint, we maintain the integrity of our system.").
82. See id. at 470. Only Justice Russon and Chief Justice Howe refuse to make identifi-
able statements that the term "Redskin" contains at least one derogatory connotation. See id. at
468-471.
83. See generally id. at 470-473; see also supra notes 29, 58,77.
84. McBride, 977 P.2d at 468.
85. Public Accommodations, supra note 69, at 911 (citations omitted). "Although there is
some counter-evidence of Indians who do not object... a few dissenting voices should not
undermine overwhelming opposition of Indian people... ("It is not a reasonable standard to
expect unanimity from any other large group of people on a given issue, there are always a
few dissenters")." Id. n.86 (quoting from the HONOR Manual for Native American Advo-
cacy).
86. Id. n.80.
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"December 1991, the NCAI adopted a resolution 'urging educational institu-
tions, businesses and organizations to abandon caricatures of American Indi-
ans that promote negative images and racism' and noting that Indian mas-
cots, 'symbols that seem innocuous to some, are offensive to Indians."'"
The majority, in its rush to declare an objective, reasonable person stan-
dard, utterly failed to provide explanation or justification for rejecting more
appropriate standards.88 Perhaps more telling in its rush, the majority did not
even address or analyze the national trend toward more specific race and
gender conscious reasonableness standards, preferring instead to claim that
relying on "any one group" is unreasonable because virtually any term could
be objectionable. 9 The McBride majority seemed intent on protecting the
status quo by selecting a safe, friendly standard that keeps the power firmly
rooted in the Court and not with the offended Native American citizens?'
The majority opinion in "gratuitously" declaring the binding standard in
these cases to be that of the objective, reasonable person failed on many dif-
ferent levels.9
IV. REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD
For years the objective, reasonable person standard has done nothing
more than perpetuate the viewpoints and biases of the white male judges ap-
plying that standard.' Historically, reliance on the objective, reasonable per-
87. Id. When dozens of protesters showed up to demonstrate against the Washington
N.F.L. team and petition the new owner to change the team name, over 30 groups sponsored
the demonstration "including the 14 top national Native American groups and a number of
religious and ethnic associations." Grech, supra note 18, at C5.
88. See generally McBride, 977 P.2d at 469-70; see infra note 91.
89. See infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text; see also McBride, 977 P.2d at 470.
90. See infra notes 92-95.
91. See McBride, 977 P.2d at 470 ("The only reasonable standard that may be applied is
that of the objective, reasonable person. In other words, under rule 873-22M-34 the Commis-
sion had to determine, in light of all the evidence presented, whether an objective, reasonable
person would conclude that the term 'redskin' contains any vulgar, derogatory, profane or ob-
scene connotation, or expresses contempt, ridicule, or superiority of race or ethnic heritage.").
92. See BRUCE WRiGrr, BLACK ROBES, WHn, JUSTICE 7 (1987) ('Today various studies
have found serious inequities in our judicial system. One reason, blacks believe, is because
those who administer the systems of justice are mostly white males. They bring to their pro-
fessions the same habits of prejudice that are inseparable from the lives they have lived, their
white neighborhoods, their white clubs and the privileges of a white skin that they have always
enjoyed."); Mary Anne Weiss, Ninth Circuit Broadens Reasonableness Standard for Hostile
Work Environment Sexual Harassment: Fuller v. City of Oakland, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 665, 701
(1997) ('The reasonable person standard, as the Ninth Circuit has recognized, reflects male
bias."); A LEON HIGG[ONTHIAM, JR., SHADES OF FREmDOM 87-90 (1996) ('Without using the
explicit terms of slavery jurisprudence, the Supreme Court nevertheless gave those slavery
precepts renewed vitality in the post-civil war era. African Americans were being killed be-
cause white citizens wanted to maintain white supremacy and to preclude African Americans
from having any political power."); Reginald Leamon Robinson, Race, Myth and Narrative in
the Social Construction of the Black Self, 40 How. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1996) ("Race Crits have chal-
lenged legal academe's hidden paradigms, an institutional consensus which consciously and
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son standard has been a tool used by United States' courts to aggressively
guard the status quo and maintain positions of power and influence crafted
by and protected by the white male dominant voice.93 Judicial officials rely-
unconsciously embraces a white male voice and his values.") [hereinafter Robinson, Race,
Myth and Narrative]; andr6 douglas pond cummings, Never Let Me Slip, 'Cause if ! Slip, Then
I'm Slippin': California's Paranoid Slide from Bakke to Proposition 209, 8 B.U. PuB. INT.
L.J. 59, 63 n.27 (1998) ("I repeat, demographically, white males are a minority. But they are
80% of tenured professors, 80% of the U.S. Congress, 90% of the U.S. Senate, 97% of school
superintendents, 92% of the top executives of all Forbes 400 industries, and 100% of all U.S.
Presidents."); J. Clay Smith, Jr., Open Letter to the President on Race and Affirmative Action,
42 How. L.J. 27, 27-28 (1998). Professor Smith notes that in a survey of the general public (or
those contributing to the objective, reasonable person opinion) the following beliefs are
strongly held:
[A] poll by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago re-
veals that 53.2% of most Americans believe blacks are less intelligent, 62.2% be-
lieve they are less hardworking, and 77.7% believe they have a greater preference
for living on welfare than whites.
Id. at 27-28. With such prejudices prevalent in society today, it seems clear that establishing
objective, reasonable person standards, particularly with regard to race and under-represented
minority groups, is short sighted.
93. See Linda J. Lacey, We Have Nothing To Fear But Gender Stereotypes: Of Katie and
Amy and "Babe Feminism," 80 CoRNEnL L. REv. 612, 631 (1995) (book review). Lacey ar-
gues that:
[c]ultural feminist insight [posits] that 'objectivity' and 'neutrality' are just masks
for the perspective of the middle class white man. As Leslie Bender explains: 'lim-
ited male perspectives are masked, erased or universalized through techniques of
objective, third-person language and author invisibility, but those techniques do
not make them less limited in fact.' The phrase 'reasonable person' appears objec-
tive on the surface, but deciding exactly what type of behavior typifies the reason-
able person is inevitably a subjective inquiry, subject to individual biases.
Id. at 631. While feminist scholars have written powerfully against a white male bias in sexual
harassment and gender discrimination cases, Critical Race Theorists decry the white male
voice and bias in the legal academy and in the judiciary as a whole. See Robinson, Race, Myth
and Narrative, supra note 92, at 14.
What sociologists have long understood, many legal academicians now face. What
Race Crits make self consciously a part of their legal analysis, white male legal
scholars wish to reject. In short, while white male legal scholars may refuse to ac-
knowledge that their identity is race mediated, Race Crits begin with the premise
that race and white supremacy mediate the Law's meaning, institutional practices,
and legal scholarship.
Id. Professor Robinson argues that so long as the white male bias and voice continues to per-
meate society and the American judicial system, presumably using the objective, reasonable
person as a tool in such permeation, then True Liberty can never be known by white men:
the struggle remains verbally fierce and institutionally violent because white males
are fighting to maintain their privileged lives, even though they have found no true
personal happiness in praying to the false totem known as white supremacy. In this
sense, if traditional and conservative white males are to gain true spiritual recogni-
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ing upon an objective, reasonable person standard will generally draw only
upon their own personal life experiences and when historically the cloth
from which most judicial officers have been cut is that of a white male up-
bringing of privilege, life experiences dealing with race, discrimination,
poverty, equity and gender often escape or elude them?4 Beyond the typical
tion, it would appear that we must necessarily witness the end of both the historical
rationale for white supremacy and its privileged white male subjects. With the end-
ing of recognition conditioned on oppression, white males can begin the inward
journey toward True Liberty.
Id. at 36. Robinson concludes that "in this dialectical and violent struggle, whites have never
known True Liberty because blacks and other people of color have never known it." Id.
Many authors have recognized the incongruity of mostly white male judges dispensing
their brand of "justice" upon people of color. See generally, andr6 douglas pond cummings,
Just Another Gang: "When The Cops Are Crooks Who Can You Trust?", 41 How. L.J. 383,
405 (1998) ("In a system where judges and lawyers remain overwhelmingly white, blacks ac-
count for a share of the prison population that far outstrips their presence in the population as a
whole.") [hereinafter cummings, Just Another Gang]; Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggres-
sion, 98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989) ("Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage
in which racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience,
we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an indi-
vidual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites."); Ian F. Haney
Lrpez, White By Law, in CRIICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTnNG EDGE 542 (Richard Delgado
ed., 1995) ("In its first words on the subject of citizenship, Congress in 1790 limited naturali-
zation to 'white persons.' Though the requirements for naturalization changed frequently
thereafter, this racial prerequisite to citizenship endured for over a century-and-a-half, remain-
ing in force until 1952. From the earliest years of this country until just a short time ago, being
a 'white person' was a condition for acquiring citizenship.") (citations omitted).
94. See Wright, supra note 92, at 19. Judge Wright writes that "[w]hite people are condi-
tioned from the time of their birth to the preferred status of their skin color. Their views of the
world at large and their own environment become solidifed by circumstances, presuppositions,
myths, clichds, and traditional folklore." Id. Judge Wright underscores his point of white privi-
lege by noting that: "in 1972 there were some 475 federal judges in America. Only 31 were
black. Of 21,294 judges canvassed, only 255 were black. [In 1987], the number of black
judges in America [was] said to be no more than 500, an average of 10 in each of the fifty
states. In such places as Alabama, Mississippi, Wyoming, or Idaho, the black judge is rare. In
New York, there are some 3,500 judges of which no more than 80 are black." Id. at 84.
The white male judges applying the reasonable person standard have all benefitted from white
privilege throughout their lives, even if they did so unwittingly. See Stephanie M. Wildman
with Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in CRT-
CAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTING EDGE 573, 575 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995). Wildman
recites the following as to white male privilege:
Many feminist theorists have described the male tilt of normative standards in law,
including the gendered nature of legal reasoning, the male bias inherent in the rea-
sonable person standard, and the gender bias in classrooms. Looking more broadly
at male privilege in society, definitions based on male models delineate many so-
cietal norms. As Catharine MacKinnon has observed: men's physiology defines
most sports, their health needs largely define insurance coverage, their socially de-
fined biographies define workplace expectations and successful career patterns,
their perspectives and concerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences and
obsessions define merit, their military service defines citizenship, their presence
defines family, their inability to get along with each other-their wars and ruler-
ships-defines history, their image defines God, and their genitals define sex.
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judge's life experience that may be devoid of interaction with difficult issues
of race, discrimination and poverty, one scholar writes that the goal of some
in powerful positions focus on ensuring that the United States remain "a
white man's country.""5
Often then, historically and still today, when a mostly male, mostly
white court decides to apply an objective, reasonable person standard, the
interpretation and subsequent result will likely be typical, traditional, slanted
heavily toward the white male bias, and often unfortunate.96 The very use of
Male privilege thus defines many vital aspects of American culture from a male
point of view. The maleness of that view masked as that view is generalized as the
societal norm, the measure for us all.
Id. at 575 (citations omitted).
95. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 136 (1998). Professor Kennedy be-
lieves that
[t]wo powerful antagonistic attitudes have shaped the decisions that have largely
determined the course of American race relations. One... is marked by an insis-
tence that, at bottom, the United States of America is, and should remain, a white
man's country. A second attitude... rejects the legitimacy of an official pigmen-
tocracy.
Id.
96. See supra notes 92-95. United States judicial history is replete with all white male
courts absolutely skewering Native American citizens with biased, hateful and racist deci-
sions. See generally Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immi-
gration Law: The Slave Trade Chronicles as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis L.J. 425 (1990) (de-
tailing the Cherokee removal and the Trail of Tears focusing specifically on attempts by the
Cherokee nation to have their rights protected in federal courts, to no avail); Robert A. Wil-
liams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of European Racism and Co-
lonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 AIZ. L. REV. 237 (1989)
(outlining the repeated refusal of United States courts to honor treaties entered into by the U.S.
Government and various Native American tribes whose rationale was that because the Native
Americans were "[a] barbarous people" they were incapable of appropriately managing the
land); Gerald Torres and Kathryn Milun, Translating "Yonnondio" by Precedent and Evi-
dence: The Mashpee Indian Case, in CRIrICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGs THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 177 (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (deconstructing a 1976
case where a judge and jury determined that the Mashpee Indians were not a "tribe" such that
their property and land rights claims were dismissed). Torres and Milun write that:
[t]he tragedy, of course, is that the failure is not merely a failure of theory. The
reservation system was badly conceived, but it never was truly intended to provide
a foundation for potentially competing powers. The reservations were designed to
pacify, not to compensate. The loss that Indians have suffered is material both in
the damage to real people and in the destruction of cultures. What has been rained
may be irretrievable, and the continuing loss inexorable. To the extent cultures are
destroyed or rendered incapable of self-expression, we are destroying individuals
in disservice to what are ostensibly our own underlying values.
Id. at 189.
One scholar has examined the objective, reasonable person test in the context of police brutal-
ity and minority citizen abuse at the hands of law enforcement officers. See Robert V. Ward,
Jr., Consensual Searches, The Fairytale That Became A Nightmare: Fargo Lessons Concern-
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the objective, reasonable person standard is by historical definition, sexist
and racist.97
As one author writes:
[t]his reasonable man standard has been considered the arbiter of fairness,
prudence, and impartiality; a summing up of the community's collective
values. In the early nineteenth century when the reasonable man standard
was first becoming established, judges, jurors, lawyers and law professors
were all [white] men. Only recently has the reasonable man been trans-
formed into the reasonable person to correct for male bias. Moreover, men
continue to outnumber women in the legal community today. A standard
that rests on community values like the reasonable person test tends to
support the status quo. Because [white] men continue to dominate the le-
gal community, the "reasonable person" standard reflects [white] male
values."
Once again, this time in the state of Utah, a white male majority on the
Supreme Court, adopted a standard of an objective, reasonable person,
and continued the historical enshrinement of objective, reasonable white
males.
One scholar writes that it is always:
inappropriate to use a reasonable person standard for disparagement when
the group from which the reasonable person springs is the general public.
In 1883, when Aunt Jemima first appeared, few among the general public
ing Police Initiated Encounters, 15 TouRo L. REv. 451, 460-61 (1999). Professor Ward
writes:
Many of the Critical Race Theorists have attempted to focus attention on the pecu-
liar adversarial relationship existing between members of minority communities
and the police. Given the long history of abuse, these people are more apt to relin-
quish their rights out of fear rather than an act of free will. A cornerstone of the
reasonable person test is the assumption that the police will honor a person's re-
quest to be left alone. People who are members of subordinated communities gen-
erally have little reason to believe that their assertion of constitutional rights will
be honored. Indeed, the relationship between the citizen and the police is based on
fear; fear which has been learned from a series of negative encounters with the po-
lice. It is the fear of the consequences of not cooperating with the police which
compels many to abandon constitutional rights.
The substance of the critique by Critical Race Theorists is that in this setting, the
Court's objective, reasonable person test, as generally applied, is oblivious to
these real life problems of police abuse. One might even argue that the objective
test perpetuates the cycle of police abuse.
Id. at 460-61 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Clearly Professor Ward believes that the
objective, reasonable person standard is inherently racist, just as feminist scholars believe the
standard is inherently sexist. See generally id.; supra notes 92-95; see also cummings, supra
note 93, at 389-97 (demonstrating police abuse against people of color within the United
States).
97. See supra notes 92-96.
98. Weiss, supra note 92, at 672 (citations omitted). The objective reasonable person
standard has been widely acknowledged as a test that protects the point of view of the domi-
nant group in power. See Gumo CALABRESI, IDEALS BELmFs, ATITuDES, AND THE LAW 22
(1985) ("[W]ays of looking at what is reasonable and what is not inevitably derive from the
point of view of those who dominate law-making in a given society.").
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found the mark disparaging, either to themselves or to blacks. Whether the
"reasonable" person-which meant a reasonable white person, given
whites' majority status-actually ever considered the question of whether
blacks felt disparaged by the mark is highly doubtful. Today, who would
argue that the mark was disparaging and highly offensive toward blacks?
Had there been any doubt, the mark would not have gone through seven
reincarnations.
The more appropriate course of action is to ask whether or not a "substan-
tial composite" of the group identified (or implicated) by a mark, or simi-
larly, whether or not a "reasonable person" who is a member of the group
identified by a mark, would judge the mark to be disparaging. This might
not be sensible in all disparagement inquiries, but is well-advised under
circumstances suggesting that a mark might be disparaging a racial minor-
ity (such as blacks) and particularly a very small minority with a history
of mistreatment in this country (such as American Indians)."
In determining offensiveness and disparagement, it was inappropriate
for the McBride majority to apply an objective, reasonable person standard,
particularly when the reasonable person was likely drawn from Utah's gen-
eral public, not from the offended minority group. Because many in the gen-
eral public have been raised up at least aware of the Washington N.F.L.
team, the football team undoubtedly comes to mind when the term is raised.
Nevertheless, the brutal historical reminder of what the term actually means,
and the acute sensitivity that Native Americans have toward the term and its
background, makes the term especially offensive to Native Americans and
sympathetic others. However, it seems that the term is generally inoffensive
to the general public or the group of objective, reasonable persons upon
which the McBride majority would draw.'" In such circumstances, the rea-
sonable person approach constituted a failure on the part of a state to protect
its insular minority group citizens from discrimination and symbols of race
hatred.
Further, the majority in its "gratuitous" declaration that the only appro-
priate standard was that of an objective, reasonable person, apparently failed
thoroughly to research and recognize that other courts across the country
have begun to apply standards specific to race and gender reasonableness.''
99. See Zlotchew, supra note 23, at 240-41 (emphasis added).
100. See generally McBride, 977 P.2d at 472-73.
101. See generally Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991)
(applying a standard of a reasonable black person in a racial harassment action); Stingley v.
Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424 (D. Ariz. 1992) (applying a reasonable African-American person
standard in a racial harassment claim); Price v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 232 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) at A-3-A-4 (Dec. 6, 1993) (the District Court instructed jurors to consider whether a
"reasonable African-American" would be adversely affected by alleged racially hostile con-
duct); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying a reasonable woman standard
in a sexual harassment action); Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990) (apply-
ing a reasonable woman standard in a sexual harassment claim); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying a reasonable woman standard in a sexual harassment ac-
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The recent application of nationwide reasonable person standards that genu-
inely consider race and gender specifically as part of the standard, (the very
definition of the "any one group" consideration vilified in the McBride ma-
jority), has gained so much national momentum, one author was moved to
declare "[aipparently, this standard is catching on rapidly."'" The McBride
majority reached its conclusion as if it was completely unaware of the trend
toward specific group reasonableness standards. Notwithstanding, the major-
ity dismisses with no analysis or thought the standard suggested in the dis-
sent, that of an objective, reasonable Native American. 3
The majority further attempted to draw support for its ineffectual stan-
dard from a California Appeals Court case using a test that specified that of-
fensiveness determinations should be made by what "people of ordinary in-
telligence (who know the language in question) would understand from the
use of the word."' 4 The majority sought to buttress its own use of the rea-
sonable person standard by citing a foreign state case that used a reasonable
person standard to invalidate a personalized license plate that depicted the
"F-word" in shorthand symbols. 5 Again, without support or rationale the
majority appropriated the same standard and ignored the important factual
differences between the California case and the Utah dispute. In McBride,
the personalized vanity plate contained an offensive racial slur that dispar-
aged a particularized minority group; in the California case, the objection-
able term was a word that is globally (not particularly) offensive and does
not implicate race, religion or ethnicity or contain an insult based thereon.
It seems logical that generally speaking, a white person, would not nec-
essarily be offended by the term "Redskin." The term does not disparage
white people generally, nor does it disparage a white ethnic group. Neverthe-
less, it seems just as logical that the sensibilities and ethics of a white person
may be deeply offended by the use of the term "Redskin" when such person
clearly understands the historical roots and implications of the term." This
offensive term does in fact disparage all Native Americans generally and
specifically references the United States' historical practice of genocide and
brutality. Notwithstanding, the majority found that relying upon the "opin-
ion" of a specific group including Native American, was unreasonable and
tion); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (applying a
reasonable woman standard in a sexual harassment claim).
102. See Saba Ashraf, The Reasonableness of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard: An
Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 483, 498 (1992).
103. See McBride, 977 P.2d at 473 (Durham, A.C.J., dissenting) ("Based on the foregoing
objections, I do not approve of the objective reasonable person standard enunciated in the ma-jority opinion. Rather, I would hold that the objections and evidence offered by those offended
should prevail.").
104. See id. at 470.
105. See id.
106. See supra note 39; see also supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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so finds without giving any legitimate or logical justification. 7
Unfortunately, the majority fails in an important opportunity to clarify
issues and make definitive statements based on race and ethnicity, choosing
instead to nonsensically dismiss more applicable standards while adopting
one that it preferred. The standard the majority has enshrined is not likely to
move the discussion forward, looking back as it does to the status quo usu-
ally preferred by the objective, reasonable person."'
V. NATIONAL TRENDS
Five professional sports teams currently have American Indian names and
mascots: the Atlanta Braves, Chicago Blackhawks, Cleveland Indians,
Kansas City Chiefs, and Washington Redskins. The accompanying mas-
cots, such as the Cleveland Indians' Chief Wahoo, represent stereotypical
and racist depictions of American Indians. In addition, team mascots,
players, and cheerleaders engage in "sham rituals"-war songs, dances,
and actions like the "tomahawk chop"-that not only manifest blatant ra-
cism, but also constitute direct attacks on American Indian religious prac-
tices. In each team's home community, paraphernalia bearing offensive
logos and slogans is ubiquitous. It is clear that the analogous use of any
other racial or ethnic group as a sports team mascot would be "socially re-
pugnant" and reprehensible.
A mounting chorus of protest denounces the use of Indian mascots and
team names as a "virulently racist practice," and the public acknowledg-
ment of impropriety is growing. Several major newspapers, for example,
have announced that they will no longer publish team names that are ra-
cially or ethnically offensive. The District of Columbia City Council has
passed a resolution requesting that the Washington Redskins change their
name. Dozens of high schools and colleges have already replaced Indian
nicknames and mascots. Despite this emergence of public sympathies in
favor of change, professional sports team owners have refused to abandon
discriminatory nicknames and mascots.
In addition to these political responses, several legal challenges have been
brought against Indian team names and mascots, including attacks under
trademark law, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (prohibiting discrimination
in federally funded programs) and a state pupil anti-discrimination law, as
well as attempts to enact statutes denying stadium funding.
19
The momentum nationally has shifted in favor of the Native American
protestors. This can be seen by coupling the Utah Supreme Court ruling and
the subsequent Tax Commission finding, together with the recent U.S. Pat-
ent and Trademark panel decision invalidating seven registered Washington
Redskins trademarks."0
107. See McBride, 977 P.2d at 469.
108. See supra notes 92-98.
109. Public Accommodations, supra note 69, at 904-05 (citations omitted).
110. See Erik Brady, Term of Non-Endearment: Redskins, Petitioner at Odds Over Mean-
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Despite this momentum away from Native American mascots and logos,
"dozens of colleges and thousands of high schools" still use variations of
Native American names, terms, culture, and symbols as school and team
nicknames."' Resistance to the reversal has been strong. Despite the fact that
"over 100 colleges and universities" have replaced Native American team
names and Indian mascots,"2 some fans and sports enthusiasts have charged
that political correctness has "run amok" in this momentum."3
Nevertheless the sea change has begun. In Cleveland, Ohio, the public
library system has enacted a new policy prohibiting its employees from
wearing any paraphernalia that displays the "Chief Wahoo" moniker."' In
Tallahassee, Florida, the call has been made to drop the Florida State Uni-
versity "Seminoles" name and mascot and, particularly, to end the football
crowd rituals of the "tomahawk chop," face paint, war whoops, and the
wearing of Native American headdresses."5 While the calls have been initi-
ing of Nickname, USA TObAY, May 12, 1999, at C1-C2. In the case pending for over seven
years, Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., several Native American petitioner's challenged the Wash-
ington Redskins trademark as disparaging and offensive. The three panel court agreed and in-
validated the trademark, pending appeal. See id.
111. Public Accommodations, supra note 69 n.2. The use of Native American mascots is
still widespread and prevalent. See id. In Wisconsin, 54 school districts have schools with Na-
tive American nicknames while 71 schools in New Jersey have Native American nicknames or
team mascots. See id.
112. Id. n.16.
113. See Weingarten, supra note 70, at Cl. In sarcastically encouraging new owner
Daniel Snyder to change the name of the Washington Redskins, Weingarten states that "[i]f
you make this change, the average Redskin fan may fuss and grumble about tradition and
oversensitivity. You will be accused of political correctness.... On some level, [the average
Redskin fan] understands this name has to go." Id. (emphasis added). Despite new awareness,
many sports enthusiasts express contempt toward individuals and schools changing racist
mascots and logos. To wit, on March 13, 1999, while driving through Louisiana, a sportstalk
radio program, WSKR Baton Rouge, The Team, was on the air discussing college basketball's
1999 "March Madness." Several sportscasters continually referred to St. John's basketball
team as the "Red Men" rather than the school's official moniker "Red Storm." Because St.
John's run through the tournament was particularly strong, the sportscasters referred to the
team over and over again, and in so doing made it a point to disparage St. John's University
for "bowing" to public pressure and caving in to "political correctness" when it officially
changed its mascot from "Red Men" to "Red Storm" several years ago. The sportscasters then
vowed to never cave to "political correctness" and maintained that as long as they both lived,
they would always refer to St. John's University as the "Red Men." Many of the listeners
called in and applauded the sportscasters for clinging to traditional American norms and refus-
ing to let political correctness rule the day.
114. See Public Accommodations, supra note 69 nn.3-4 ("Chief Wahoo is a grinning cari-
cature of an American Indian 'nearly always painted bright red with overly huge front teeth,
shifty eyes, and a headband with a feather protruding from behind."')
115. See generally Alan Schmadtke, Professor: Drop Seminoles, <http://www.orlando
sentinel.com/sports/colleges/041599__FSU 15_13.HTM>, Apr. 15, 1999. A highly regarded
member of Florida State University's athletic board recently addressed the board as follows:
We're going to lose this issue. It's only a matter of time.... It doesn't help to have
plains Indians representing seminole Indians [on logos] on shirts out there-that
we make a large profit on-with caricatures that are degrading [to Native Ameri-
cans].... I'm here to tell you we're in a decided minority on this issue. We're es-
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ated to drop the "Seminoles" as a mascot and to drop the sham rituals, resis-
tance will undoubtedly be strong from the Florida State community. 6 Every
Saturday football home game in Tallahassee, finds over 80,000 fans standing
in Doak Campbell Stadium chanting and wielding imaginary tomahawks. "7
This time honored derogatory tradition will be difficult to break for many
Floridians.
Nevertheless, professional sports teams that adamantly refuse to give up
racist logos and culturally derogatory mascots will ultimately be implicated
by history and such judgments will be harsh."8
In Cleveland, Ohio, protestors continue to dog Cleveland Indians own-
ership and owner Dick Jacobs for staunchly refusing to change the teams'
logo and mascot. "9 On opening day 1999, at the stadium entrance, protestors
laid a straw Chief Wahoo inside a coffin and proceeded to bum the coffin to
ashes. 20 Several protestors claimed that their actions were designed to make
America aware of obvious racism still aimed at Native Americans today and
at their culture.' "The main thrust of the Native American community is to
call attention to the racism of the Chief Wahoo logo.... Going to Jacobs
Field and demonstrating is a critical part of that," claimed Native American
Attorney Terry Gilbert. 22 To draw attention to the cause whenever the At-
lanta Braves or Cleveland Indians have played in the World Series, protes-
tors have come out in force seeking to turn national attention toward private
use of publicly disparaging mascots and logos.
sentially alone on this issue, Frankly. I know the alumni don't want to hear it, the
fans don't want to hear it, the boosters don't want to hear it. But this is a losing
battle.
Id.
116. See generally id. Professor Schmadtke points out just how resistant he expects
alumni, students and fans to be to the suggested changes by affirmatively stating that he knows
the alumni and fans "don't want to hear it." See id.
117. See generally id.
118. See generally supra note 96. When reflecting on poor reasoning and racist language
used historically in past opinions, the refusal by owners of professional sports teams to do the
right thing by changing the names of their franchises, will likely be viewed in the future as
stubborn and ignorant.
119. See Protestors of Cleveland Indians' Logo Burn Coffin, <http://www.pointcast.
corn>, <http://127.0.0.1:15841>, Apr. 12, 1999. As the Cleveland Indians opened the 1999
baseball campaign, the team was greeted by dozens of protestors challenging the teams' use of
Chief Wahoo as a symbol and logo and "Indians" as the team mascot. See id.
120. See id. "Similar protests against the grinning, red-faced Chief Wahoo have resulted
in arrests in recent years, but there were no arrests Monday [April 12, 1999]." Id.
121. See id.
122. Id. For years Native Americans and others have protested the use of the "Indians"
name and the Chief Wahoo logo, sometimes resulting in arrests and later claims of wrongful
arrest, illegal imprisonment and violation of free speech rights by those arrested. See id. "Five
protestors who were arrested on suspicion of arson last year after a straw figure of Wahoo was
burned have sued city police for allegedly violating their civil rights." Id.
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Further, in a weak attempt to deflect growing public criticism, the
Cleveland Indians organization has floated the notion to the media and its
fans that the team name of "Indians" is actually an honorarium of the first
ever Native American baseball player, Louis Sockalexis, who, according to
team officials, played for the Indians in the 1890s."n "The Indians have long
maintained that their name honors Louis Sockalexis, a Penobscot Indian,
who was the first American Indian to play major league baseball more than
100 years ago."' 4 More recently, the Washington N.F.L. team organization,
in its own weak attempt to deflect growing public criticism, also claimed
that the name "Redskins" was taken to honor a Native American historical
figure involved with football." Washington team officials claim that "their
name honors Lone Star Deitz, an early coach of the team who was part
Sioux.""126
Amazingly, Washington team officials have recently claimed that
"[o]ver the long history of the Washington Redskins, the name has reflected
positive attributes of the American Indian such as dedication, courage and
pride.... The team has become an institution in the city of Washington, and
the team's popularity unifies the nation's capital." 27 One Native American
activist vigorously disputes the Washington team officials' declarations by
proclaimimg that "[tihe name has never been an honorific, and no matter
how many times they say, it never will be .... 'To persist in this is so arro-
gant.... The owners... cannot claim ignorance."'s
This stretch by Cleveland and Washington to attach historical signifi-
cance and relevance to their racist logos and mascots might be humorous if it
were not so hypocritical and myopic. Recent articles and cursory research
has found that no evidence exists historically that the "Indians" took the
name to honor a Native American ballplayer but was a mascot instead se-
lected by a "group of sports writers." '29
History will judge harshly the private owners of these professional
sports franchises for clinging so tenaciously to their racist, derogatory, de-
123. See Milton Alan Turner, Indians Deserve New Name for Millennium, USA TODAY,
May 18, 1999, at C3.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. Grech, supra note 18, at C5. Washington team officials apparently ignore the his-
torical roots and connotations of the term "Redskin" when they try to claim that the team's use
of the name is a noble one, like unto an honorarium. See id.; see also supra note 70, and ac-
companying text.
128, See Grech, supra note 18, at C5 ('Words have meaning. We signed so many treaties
that didn't mean what we thought they did.... At first it may appear to be a narrow issue [the
Redskin dispute], but it is so contextual, so atmospheric. If we can't get this right, how can we
work on the more difficult issues?").
129. Id. "However, a May 17 Cleveland Plain Dealer article reveals that a check of four
Cleveland newspapers from Jan. 1 through April 15, 1915 does not support this theory [that
the team was named to honor Sockalexis] and suggests that the decision was made by a group
of sportswriters." Id.
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meaning and ultimately insensitive mascots, logos and rituals. 3 '
V. CONCLUSION
The Utah Supreme Court ruling, together with the Tax Commission's
subsequent finding, mark the beginning of the sea change with respect to
Native American symbols, names and rituals as mascots and logos."' The
U.S. Patent and Trademark decision, which was announced just months after
the Utah Supreme Court ruling, will also serve to force appropriate change
through the law.' Additionally, as courts across the country move toward
opening and redefining the reasonable person standard to a point where of-
fensiveness will be determined according to a reasonable member of the tar-
get group standard, the force of judicial opinion should finally shift. Ulti-
mately, the distant yet distinct voice of Native American citizens will be
heard.
3 3
130. See supra notes 96, 118.
131. See supra notes 106-128.
132. See supra note 110.
133. See WALEDA, Wounded Knee, on WALEDA (Mercury Records, 1997).
This trio of Native American (Cherokee) recording artists poignantly call for a future
where their voices will be heard and remembered.
Bury my heart at wounded knee; where a baby's blood was a soldiers pay; bury
my heart at wounded knee; let it lie with my brothers 'till the judgment day; my
people were the earth and the earth was home; when they stole their land then they
stole their bones; let my people, let my people pass crossing over this Jordan is all
we ask, take the eyes of the guns of peace; my people can't eat promises, but they
can pray; now my blood is flowing back to Tennessee; and my soul is moving in
and out of reach; I'm dancing cause I carry my father's seed; and I'm walking on
this earth to see my people free. Bury my heart at wounded knee.
Id.
